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JUDGE RICHARD POSNER'S 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Robert S. Summers* 
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE. By Richard A. Posner. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press. 1990. Pp. xiv, 485. $29.95. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judge Posner is justly famous for his work on the economic analy-
sis of law (and for many fine judicial opinions). He has also immersed 
himself in jurisprudential, philosophical, moral, scientific, and other 
literature, and has in The Problems of Jurisprudence now worked out 
and published his views on many of the traditional problems of juris-
prudence. In some instances, he adopts the general jurisprudential po-
sitions of earlier thinkers. In other instances, his views are more his 
own creation. 
I will only treat Judge Posner's general views (although not com-
prehensively) on the nature of law and legal validity, on formality and 
the formalistic in law, on statutory interpretation, on precedent, on 
law's autonomy, and, very briefly, on legal education. I have had to be 
selective. These topics comprise no more than half of those Judge Pos-
ner addresses. 
II. THE NATURE OF LAW AND LEGAL VALIDITY 
Judge Posner adopts a predictivist and behaviorist theory of law. 
He also indicates, correctly, that I will "disagree" with his theory (p. 
26 n.41). Here are his core ideas: 
Although unlikely to posit the existence of so abstract an entity as 
"the law,'' Holmes realized that since law affected behavior it was "real" 
in some sense. The solution to the dilemma was to ask how law affects 
behavior. The state has coercive power, and people want to know how 
to keep out of the way of that power. So they go to lawyers for advice. 
All they want to know is whether the power of the state will come down 
on them if they engage in a particular course of action. To advise them 
the lawyer must predict how the judges, who decide when the state's 
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coercive power may be applied to a person, will act if his client engages 
in the proposed course of action and is sued. Law is thus simply a pre-
diction of how state power will be deployed in particular circumstances. 
Law, an abstract entity, is dissolved into physical force, also an abstract 
entity but one that has a more solid ring and, more important, can be 
interpreted in behavioral terms: if I do X, the sheriff will eventually 
seize and sell property of mine worth $Y. The prediction theory con-
ceives the law as disposition rather than as object. To say of an act that 
it is unlawful is to predict certain consequences if the act is performed, 
just as to say that an object is heavy is to predict certain consequences if 
it is dropped or thrown. 
This conception overlooks the people who obey the law because it is 
the law, and so it has come to be called the "bad man" theory of law. 
But the oversight may not be critical. There may not be many "good 
men" in the specific sense of people who comply with laws merely out of 
respect for law, a felt moral obligation to obey it. [p. 223] 
We can if we like say that the judges, in acting - that is, in deciding 
cases - "make law," and so the law is what judges do as well as predic-
tions of what they will do. There is no contradiction once the prediction 
theory is subsumed under a broader activity theory of law. The impor-
tant thing is that law is something that licensed persons, mainly judges, 
lawyers, and legislators, do . . . . [p. 225] 
It is evident from the foregoing key passages that Judge Posner, in 
addressing the question: "What is law?," does not, in more traditional 
fashion, construe this question to require a jurisprudential analysis of 
the general nature of a system of law as a whole. 1 Thus, he displays 
little interest in such issues as the foundations of a legal order, or the 
structure and unity of a legal system, or the nature and varieties of 
rules in a legal system, or the essential techniques used to secure law's 
goals. Rather, although he does not put it this way, Judge Posner is 
here mainly interested in what legal theorists refer to as the theory of 
legal validity, that is, a theory of what criteria putative law must sat-
isfy to be valid. His focus is on "law as a source of rights, duties, and 
powers," and still more narrowly, on law so conceived from the van-
tage point of a judge in the American system.2 
The theories, above, that Judge Posner adopts on the subject of 
legal validity were made famous by Holmes - predictivism3 - and 
Llewellyn - behaviorism.4 Judge Posner is aware that these theories 
have been subjected to what are now rather standard objections. Yet 
1. Cj, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
2. P. 221. At several places, he articulates the view that law really dissolves entirely into 
physical force. See pp. 223, 296, 455. He seems unaware of the vast literature highly critical of 
the "force" conception, and he makes no attempt to address any of the now standard objections 
to that position. For a summary of these objections, see Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurispru-
dence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 433, 445-46 (1978). 
3. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459, 460-61 (1897). 
4. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1930) ("What these officials do about disputes 
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he offers little argument in response to these objections. It would be 
tedious to rehearse here all of these objections, and in any case I have 
already set them out elsewhere. 5 I will restrict myself largely to some 
points that I consider to be most telling. I will stress that what Judge 
Posner offers cannot, conceptually, qualify as a theory of legal validity, 
and whether or not I am right about this, I will show that what he 
offers is simply not the theory of validity prevalent in our legal system. 
There is, of course, tension between the two basic notions Judge 
Posner stresses here: valid law as a prediction of judicial action, and 
valid law as what judges do. Although these often overlap, they some-
times diverge, and then one rather than the other must prevail. Judge 
Posner apparently believes that what the judges do is the law, even if 
this turns out not to be the predictable outcome (p. 225). 
The fundamental flaw in any predictive-behavioral conceptualiza-
tion of legal validity is precisely that the ultimate "criterion" of valid 
law is simply what the judges do. In such a conceptualization, the 
highest judges simply cannot make mistakes of law. If whatever they 
ultimately do is ipso facto valid, they cannot be mistaken. This, as 
H.L.A. Hart stressed many years ago, confuses judicial finality with 
infallibility and immunizes judges' behavior from criticism for non-
conformity with law.6 Contrary to Judge Posner's position, a legal 
system must have legal standards for identifying valid law (and for 
interpreting and applying it in particular cases). Insofar as judges 
identify and apply law at variance with these standards, they make 
legal mistakes, and are accordingly subject to criticism on precisely 
this ground.7 Such criticism, along with the potential for it in particu-
lar cases, forms one of the major avenues through which the rule of 
law is sustained in our society. At one point, Judge Posner manifests 
some awareness of this kind of objection to his theory: 
We think oflaw not only as what judges do but also as the criterion for 
evaluating what they do. The activity [behavioral] theory is incomplete. 
Its critics are right that it is an impoverished theory oflaw. But it is only 
mildly impoverished. When slightly enriched with a weak sense of natu-
ral law, it becomes the best positive theory of law that we have. [p. 228] 
Even if Judge Posner patches up his theory with a bit of natural 
law (in his terms, "ethical" and "policy" considerations), this cannot 
remedy the foregoing basic flaw. For that flaw differs from the one 
Judge Posner seeks to correct. The basic flaw in his theory is its fail-
is, to my mind, the law itself."). See Llewellyn's own retraction in K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAM-
BLE BUSH 8-10 (1960). 
5. See generally R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY chs. 4-
5 (1982). 
6. H. HART, supra note 1, at 138-44. 
7. Of course, where a court is acting to change the law, this action is not to be characterized 
as a mistake, although it may be criticized on other grounds. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 
114. 
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ure to make an appropriate place for the possibility of mistaken identi-
fications of valid law. This failure, in turn, leaves no place for that 
social practice so essential to maintenance of the rule of law, namely, 
criticism of judicial behavior precisely on the ground that it fails to 
conform to accepted legal standards for identifying valid law. 
In sum, behavioral "criteria" of valid law simply cannot constitute 
criteria of valid law independent of what judges actually do. Thus, a 
behavioral theory cannot qualify as a theory of legal validity in the 
first place. Such a theory necessarily requires independent legal crite-
ria of validity. 
Judge Posner, nevertheless, does not lack the courage of his con-
victions. His predictivist-behavioral theory leads him to view prece-
dents, and, presumably, statutes and other forms of law, merely as 
"essential inputs into the predictive process" (p. 227). Thus, he says, 
precedents "are not 'the law' itself" (p. 227). These are merely behav-
ioral inputs. (A fortiori, rules and principles governing the techniques 
accepted within the system for interpreting and applying valid law are 
also in no sense law.) Yet he suggests from time to time that it is at 
least a criticism of a legal theory that it is quite at variance with nor-
mal legal usage (p. 228). Certainly our normal legal usage is to regard 
as law, even for the highest judges, those precedents and statutes that 
are valid under the criteria of validity prevalent in our system. 
If I am correct that Judge Posner's theory of legal validity is con-
ceptually incapable of serving as a theory of legal validity, it follows 
that his theory cannot be the theory of legal validity that prevails in 
our system. Our overall theory of validity is highly complex, as the 
admirable writing of Professor Greenawalt attests. 8 The theory that 
prevails in our system includes (1) an independent and largely antece-
dent set of source-oriented standards for determining valid law, and 
(2) various content-oriented standards.9 What I call source-oriented 
standards include due enactment by a duly authorized legislature in 
the case of statutes, and proper adoption by appropriate courts in the 
case of precedents. Content-oriented standards include various sub-
stantive requirements of constitutions. Only a small book or an ex-
tended essay could provide a comprehensive account. What the law is 
on a given point is determined by reference to these independent crite-
ria, and lawyers advise clients in light of the substantive or procedural 
law so identified (and in light of techniques of interpretation and appli-
cation prevalent within our system).10 Thus, valid precedents and 
8. Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 621 (1987); 
see also R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 101-35; Summers, Toward a Better General Theory of 
Legal Validity, 16 RECHTSTHEORIE 65 (1985). 
9. See infra section 111.B. 
10. Of course, Judge Posner understands these things. What he does not grasp so clearly is 
how they embarrass his general theory. Sometimes it seems that by a "prediction" theory, Judge 
Posner might only be referring to the necessarily future-regarding processes whereby a lawyer or 
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valid statutes are considered valid law as such, and not mere "inputs" 
in processes of prediction. It is a very great virtue of our system that 
citizens generally need not wait until a court acts before they can 
know their legal rights (and in many cases they can know those rights 
with great certainty). Of course, unclear cases arise in which there are 
no determinate answers, but Judge Posner concedes that predictivism 
itself is "unusable in areas of profound legal uncertainty" (p. 224). 
Judge Posner wants, for present purposes, to conceptualize prece-
dents, statutes, and presumably other forms of law merely as "inputs" 
into judicial behavior (pp. 227, 239). A mere "input" is not as such a 
norm, yet precedents and statutes are, properly conceived, normative 
phenomena under which legal reasons for action arise - reasons 
which are binding on citizens and officials, including judges. Indeed, 
judicial behavior becomes open. to criticism when it disregards such 
binding reasons. Precedents and statutes have normative significance 
in still other ways, too. For example, they serve as bases for claims of 
right. Predictivism and behaviorism, however empiricist they may be, 
are also doctrines that cannot yield, let alone do justice to, the norma-
tive character of law. Rather, they obscure it. 11 
III. FORMALITY AND THE "FORMALISTIC" IN LAW 
Judge Posner is primarily interested in the substance of the law, 
not its form. He therefore shares the preoccupation of most American 
legal theorists with substantive "policy" and "principle" to the neglect 
of legal formality in all its varieties. Relatedly, his favorite critical 
epithet appears to be "formalistic," a term of legal criticism in 
America the precise meaning of which is often left unspecified. 12 
Judge Posner rarely addresses frontally any of the general varieties of 
legal formality to be found in law, nor does he systematically consider 
the general rationales for their existence.13 Indeed, he usually does not 
even recognize legal formality in the law for what it is. He proclaims, 
rather, that "I am not a formalist" (pp. 33), as if it were possible for a 
careful theorist to be a nonformalist. To Judge Posner, and to count-
lower court judge identifies, interprets, and applies law in accord with applicable legal standards. 
I have argued elsewhere that this is not really a predictivist theory at all. R. SUMMERS, supra 
note 5, at 118. 
11. Again, Judge Posner knows that law is, somehow, normative. What he does not grasp is 
how his theory obscures and distorts this fact. (I, of course, do not claim that from the normativ-
ity of law it follows that all law is good. This is a complex matter that I cannot go into here.) 
12. Professor Brian Simpson has observed that the term "formalism" in legal criticism is the 
"most ill defined of legal ailments". Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 
46 U. CHI. L. RBv. 533, 534 (1979). 
13. For a preliminary effort in this vein, see Summers, Theory, Formality, and Practical Legal 
Criticism, 106 LAW Q. RBv. 407 (1990) [hereinafter Summers, Theory]. See also P. ATIYAH & 
R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW (1987); Summers, Statutes 
and Contracts as Founts of Formal Reasoning in EssAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH (forthcoming 
1991). 
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less American legal theorists and other academics, formality simply 
has no appropriate place in law - law is all substance and no form. 
Were Judge Posner to address himself more frontally to the nature, 
varieties, and roles of formality in law, he would come to see that the 
law is shot through with formality, that nearly all the varieties of for-
mality found in law are in varying degrees essential to law, and that 
legal formality is not without its own distinctive substantive justifica-
tions. He would also come to see that more precise meanings for "for-
malistic" can be specified, and that law can be criticized not merely for 
being overformal, or "formalistic,"14 but also for being underformal, 
or "substantivistic."ls 
Judge Posner criticizes as "formalistic" both the actual phenomena 
of our law and the theories of legal theorists about these phenomena. I 
think he is correct to suggest that we can get a sense of what is meant 
by "formalistic" if we bring a "form versus substance" contrast into 
play and then seek to unpack criticism for overformality in light of 
this contrast (p. 40). But he does not see the numerous "form versus 
substance" contrasts at work in law and legal criticism. There is not 
just one possibly "useful" sense of "formalistic," but many.16 And 
nowhere does Judge Posner identify even a single basic variety oflegal 
formality and treat it for what it is, namely, one of various essentially 
formal elements of law itself, with its own special set of rationales. Of 
course, these background rationales are themselves substantive, and 
may even be thought of as the substance oflegal formality. Still, as we 
will see, this leaves intact the more specific form-substance contrasts in 
the foreground. 
I will examine a limited number of form-substance contrasts in the 
law, identify essential varieties of formality involved, and clarify the 
more specific senses of the overformal (the "formalistic") parasitic on 
these contrasts. This approach also enables me to suggest something 
of the range and variety of types of justified formality in the law and 
the varied rationales for them. Despite sixty or seventy years of unre-
lenting academic and other criticism asserting that nearly everything 
wrong with the law is "formalistic," American law has not yet today 
ended up as "all substance and no form." Nor could it. 
Law must be analyzed in terms of complex fusions and interactions 
of various types of formality with relevant substance. Instead of pro-
claiming "I am not a formalist," Judge Posner should recognize and 
embrace necessary and justified formality in the law, and, only in re-
gard to the overformal, proclaim that he is not "formalistic." Thus, 
he should say that he is a "formalist" as well as a "substantivist," each 
14. Judge Posner does not always use "formalistic" pejoratively, but he usually does. 
15. See generally Summers, Theory, supra note 13, at 408-09. 
16. See generally Summers Theory, supra note 13; K. ENGISCH, BEITRAGE ZUR RECHTSTHE-
ORIE 251-85 (1984). 
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in the measure appropriate to the relevant form-substance fusion 
under analysis. This fundamental jurisprudential truth is not at all 
well understood in America today, at least not in these terms. 
In the following sections, I seek to demonstrate the foregoing in a 
general way (although without continuously revisiting Judge Posner's 
own particular views). In each topic, I introduce a basic variety of 
formality, identify some of the justifications for its existence in law, 
and suggest how it may go awry as "formalistic." Here I can only 
identify several of the varieties of formality in the law, and I cannot 
subject each to the detailed analysis it merits. Nor can I explore the 
conceptual necessity of each, let alone the nature and bearing of the 
various underlying rationales that (with problem-specific considera-
tions) determine the appropriate levels or degrees of the varieties of 
formality as they appear in the law. Yet the varieties I take up are 
sufficient to indicate the rich and multifaceted nature of legal formal-
ity, phenomena more often known in our system by other 
nomenclature. 
A. Systems of Law 
A legal system is, in the most general terms, a complex fusion of 
form and substance. It is substantive in that it must, to exist in the 
first place, contain a certain minimum substantive content. Thus, 
without rules restricting the free use of force, rules protecting at least 
some types of private property, and rules enforcing certain types of 
promises, a legal system would lack the substance required to secure 
the popular cooperation necessary for official uses of coercion against 
malefactors. Without this cooperation the system could not be 
viable.17 
On the other hand, even at this very general level of analysis, the 
legal system has a contrasting side that may be characterized as for-
mal. Thus, among other things, a legal system must have rules and 
other preceptual forms to "house" this minimum substantive content; 
these preceptual forms must be brought into being authoritatively, and 
there must be authoritative processes for identifying such precepts and 
for interpreting and applying them in contested cases. These precep-
tual forms and these processes are all content-independent, and thus in 
this sense formal. We can readily see that powerful substantive ratio-
nales justify this formal side of the law, including a concern for legiti-
macy, for rationality, for orderliness, and for definitive resolution of 
substantive disputes in the making and application of law. 18 Surely, 
then, with regard to the constitutive structure and content of a legal 
system, the theorist would not want to sa~, with Judge Posner, "I am 
17. See H. HART, supra note 1, at 189-95. 
18. There are other rationales, but there is no need to go into them. 
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not a formalist.,, The foregoing general variety of formality in a legal 
system is a necessity, and even a high level of it is justified in light of 
the above rationales. 
Now, this general contrast between form and substance, as well as 
the fusion of form and substance I have described, provides the basis 
for analyzing appropriate levels of a basic variety of formality - "con-
stitutive formality" - and for specifying the meaning here of the criti-
cal expression "formalistic.,, The appropriately formal analysis 
honors the requisite fusion of form and substance in light of the above 
rationales for constitutive formality. The "formalistic" does not. It is 
overformal, and thus neglects requisite substance in some way. For 
example, the theory of a positivist who contends that a legal system 
can have "just any substantive content" and still remain a legal system 
may be justly criticized as formalistic - as neglecting the requisite 
minimum substantive content of law. 
B. Legal Validity 
In a legal system such as ours, the criteria for identifying valid law 
may be considered a complex unity of form and substance. Within 
this system, some types of putative law cannot qualify as valid law 
unless they satisfy not merely formal, "source-oriented" criteria of va-
lidity but also substantive, "content-oriented" criteria (which may 
themselves derive from authoritative sources). For example, to be 
valid, it may be that a putative law must not only be duly adopted by 
an authorized legal source such as a legislature, but also must not of-
fend the substantive, content-oriented requirements of a constitution. 
Again, powerful rationales support such "source-oriented" (and there-
fore formal) criteria of validity. These include legitimacy, legislative 
autonomy, representative democracy, and the minimum definitiveness 
required of enacted law. It is difficult to imagine a theorist addressing 
such formal criteria of validity who would want to say here: "I am not 
a formalist." A source-oriented and therefore content-independent 
criterion of valid law is an essential element in this complex fusion of 
form and substance, an element that may be called "validity" 
formality. 
It is now possible to see readily how a theorist could go astray here 
and, in regard to a particular system, present a purportedly descriptive 
theory of validity that merits criticism as "formalistic." Suppose, for 
example, that such a theorist advances a descriptive theory that, in our 
own system, only formal, source- oriented criteria determine the valid-
ity of precedent. That is, precedent only needs to be laid down by an 
appropriate court to be valid. Such a theory would be mistaken be-
cause our system also generally requires that a precedent survive some 
period of evaluation or testing for minimum substantive rationality if 
that precedent is to take its place as "settled" and therefore as valid 
1310 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1302 
law within our system.19 Here, we would say that the theory is for-
malistically inaccurate and thus undersubstantive. That is, the theory 
acknowledges only the formal, source-oriented criterion of validity 
and entirely neglects the content-oriented, substantive criterion that in 
fact also applies to determine the validity of precedent in our system. 
(Of course, a prescriptive theory might be formalistic, too.) 
C. Continuity and Change in Law 
Many features of legal institutions and processes and many legal 
devices and techniques may operate, by design or otherwise, to inhibit 
change in the substantive content of law. At least insofar as this is by 
design, so that these features, devices, and techniques secure some 
continuity of the law's content independently of the quality of its sub-
stance, we may view these features, devices, and techniques together as 
exhibiting and securing a general kind of formality - call it "con-
tinuity formality," a variety of formality that is frequently not recog-
nized for what it is. Plainly, some legal systems exhibit very high 
continuity formality. 
To be more specific, the formal features of legal institutions and 
processes that secure continuity include those that operate in legisla-
tures to inhibit the adoption of new substantive law. These features 
consist of formal procedural requirements - not only for amending 
old statutes, but for passing new ones. There are functionally similar 
formal features of adjudicative processes} including provision for dis-
missal of claims on the ground that they are not yet recognized in law, 
as well as various doctrines such as standing and ripeness that limit 
the justiciability of issues at the trial court level. Similarly, various 
content-independent norms limit the power to overrule precedent at 
the appellate level. 
Still other legal devices and techniques secure continuity of law 
regardless of the quality of its substantive content. For example, case 
law may be transformed into formal statute law, which is generally 
rather less changeable than case law. Also, the power of courts to 
exercise discretion may be transformed into relatively hard and fast 
rules. 
Various powerful rationales justify a significant general level of 
what I here call continuity formality, and thus justify the features of 
institutions and processes, and other devices and techniques, that se-
cure it. Continuity of substantive content in law avoids the confusions 
of excessive legal change, facilitates planning, protects citizen reliance, 
19. See R. SUMMERS, LoN L. FULLER 50 (1984); Summers, Summers's Primer on Fuller's 
Jurisprudence - A Wholly Disinterested Assessment of the Reviews by Professors Wueste and 
LeBe/, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 1231, 1247-48 (1986); see also Hart, Holmes' Positivism - An 
Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 936 n.21 (1951). 
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and more. Given the force of these rationales, few theorists should 
want to say: "I am not a formalist." 
On the other hand, when the various features of lawmaking 
processes and other formal devices and techniques of the law function 
in ways that secure continuity at the expense of needed substantive 
change and growth in the law's content, this level of continuity for-
mality may be appropriately criticized as overformal, that is, formalis-
tic. Indeed a whole system might ossify. A theory that embraces legal 
continuity excessively is formalistic. Such a theory unduly privileges 
the content-independent (formal) features of the system favoring con-
tinuity.20 In a relatively "closed" system, excessive continuity formal-
ity may drive change underground, so that change occurs mainly 
through legal fictions and the like, rather than out in the open. It 
should hardly be surprising that judicial resort to legal fictions is 
sometimes criticized as formalistic, too. 
D. Particular Laws and Legal Doctrines 
Particular laws and legal doctrines can themselves also be ana-
lyzed as complex fusions of form and substance in which several vari-
eties of formality commonly play appropriate roles. Among the 
varieties of formality that play roles in the creation and application of 
valid law and legal doctrine are: 
(1) the formality of arbitrary yet justified fiat in the material content of 
a law or doctrine 
(2) the formality of modes of expressing the law (for example, the ca-
nonical form of a statute) 
(3) the formality of the preceptual design of a law or doctrine - its 
"close-endedness" (as in the case of a narrow rule) 
Each of these types of formality (and there are others) involves a 
somewhat different form-substance contrast, and the various ratio-
nales behind each are not identical (although they overlap). At the 
same time, each may go awry and be subject to criticism as overformal 
and thus "formalistic." A theorist might grasp the essence of these 
points without realizing how the phenomena may be appropriately 
conceptualized, as above, in terms of legal formality, and without real-
izing how varying levels of such formality in the law are justified in 
terms of the applicable rationales behind them. Such a theorist might 
still have a nose for the overformal here, and thus be ready to con-
demn the "formalistic." 
One general example, what I call "close-ended formality," will suf-
fice.21 Close-ended formality is rather special. It is an attribute of the 
20. On the importance of "rules of change" in a legal system, see H. HART, supra note 1, at 
93-96. 
21. For more on close-ended formality, see generally Summers, Theory, supra note 13, at 
419-25. 
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preceptual form of official commands, statutes, regulations, common 
law doctrines, or other species of law. Many different preceptual 
forms are known to the law, including general orders, specific orders, 
hard and fast rules, flexible rules, principles (of several varieties), gen-
eral maxims, specific maxims, narrow grants of discretion, broad 
grants of discretion, and more. These preceptual forms vary greatly in 
the degree to which they are complete as law at inception. The more 
complete, the more close- ended. Thus, for example, an enacted pre-
cept that takes the form of a hard and fast rule without exceptions is 
complete in content at inception, totally close-ended, and thus does 
not require an infusion of substantive reasoning to fill it out when it is 
applied. On the other hand, broad grants of discretion depend for es-
sential content on infusions of substance by a court (or other body) 
when they are applied, and thus display low close- endedness. All 
types of law have some degree of close-endedness. The degree of 
close-endedness may be justifiably high or low, depending upon appli-
cable rationales (and their interaction with problem-specific 
considerations). 
Close-endedness is formal because it indicates how far a law is 
closed to further authoritative infusion of substantive legal content at 
the point of application. Thus, the form-substance contrast here is be-
tween (1) nondependence of the law upon further infusion of substan-
tive content at point of application (formal), on the one hand, and (2) 
dependence upon such infusion (substantive), on the other. 
Even quite high close-ended formality may be justified. Among 
the general justifications for high levels are certainty, predictability, 
facilitation of citizen planning, equality before the law, ease of admin-
istration, and minimization of disputes. Again here, it will not do for 
the theorist to say: "I am not a formalist." Formality is, in varying 
degrees, essential to law, and even high levels of it may be justified in 
some areas. 22 
As with all varieties of legal formality, close-endedness may go 
awry. For example, a hard and fast and thus formally complete rule 
may be overformal because it forecloses desirable (all things consid-
ered) judicial infusion of substantive content when the rule is applied. 
Yet again, it hardly follows from the "formalistic" character of this 
rule that close-ended formality is entirely unjustifiable in the law. 
E. Particular Legal Facts 
Law must be applied to legal facts, and formality plays a large role 
in regard to legal facts. Legal facts may be one thing and actual facts 
another. The substance here consists of all possible evidence relevant 
22. Judge Posner is, of course, aware of the phenomenon here, although he does not recog-
nize it for what it is - a type of formality. Compare p. 48 ("it would be a mistake to denounce 
rules tout court") with p. 445 (legal prudentialism is a cautionary against formalism). 
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to the facts in issue before a court (or before another tribunal, or even 
before a lawyer advising a client). Yet the law may not require that 
the ultimate finding of fact or verdict be based on all the relevant evi-
dence. Indeed, the law may explicitly preclude consideration of all 
relevant evidence. In such cases, the finding of fact (or verdict) will 
still count as fact for the law's purposes. Insofar as ultimate legal facts 
need not be based on all relevant evidence, they reflect a formal theory 
of legal truth. Of course, a substantive theory of truth will also be 
concurrently at work, for ultimate legal facts must usually rest on 
some relevant evidence. Thus again, we have a complex fusion of form 
and substance. 
To the extent an ultimate finding or verdict contains a formal ele-
ment, this may be justified by reference to various general rationales, 
as well as to various problem-specific considerations that may point in 
the same way as the rationales in the circumstances (such as a policy 
favoring safety that excludes evidence of repairs subsequent to an acci-
dent). The general rationales that operate to justify findings not based 
on all the evidence are familiar. They include the efficiency of running 
a factfinding process (such as adjudication), not intermittently over a 
long period but continuously within a brief period, even though this 
means the factfinder cannot hear some witnesses. There is also the 
general undesirability of requiring any and all witnesses, no matter 
what the circumstances, to attend a factfinding proceeding, and there 
is the general importance of finality in factfinding even in the face of 
the discovery of further relevant evidence after the proceeding ends. 
Because of the force of such rationales (and of any concurrently appli-
cable problem-specific considerations), a legal factfinding may even be 
untrue or at least contrary to the probabilities, yet still be accepted as 
legally binding on the parties. Here, too, no theorist should, in the 
face of this, proclaim: "I am not a formalist," and thus repudiate all 
formality in legal factfinding. Instead, the theorist should embrace 
some element of "truth formality," as justified, in a system of law. 
Of course, processes of factfinding might be overformal, and thus 
the system, and also the theory of legal truth for the system, might be 
subject to criticism as formalistic.23 Yet it would hardly follow from 
the existence of excessive truth formality in a given factfinding process 
that such a process can contain no trace of truth formality not itself 
subject to condemnation as formalistic.24 
23. A critique addressed partly to this general type of overformality is Pound, The Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906) (asserting 
that cases should generally be decided on their substantive merits rather than on merely formal 
points of pleading). 
24. Judge Posner is, of course, cognizant of my basic point here, but again does not concep-
tualize the phenomena as formal. See pp. 205-06. 
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F. Legal Reasoning 
Here I will take up several varieties of the formal and the formalis-
tic in legal reasoning. I must open with some preliminary distinctions. 
Legal reasons may empower or require judges, other officials, and pri-
vate citizens and entities to decide or act in indicated ways. Legal 
reasons may be deployed to guide, to justify, to criticize, and more. 
Such guidance, justification, and criticism typically involve complex 
fusions of form and substance within what I call formal reasons, and 
as between formal and substantive reasons. 
Formal· legal reasons must be differentiated from substantive rea-
sons. Formal legal reasons arise under statutes, precedents, and other 
species of valid law, and their legal authoritativeness and content are 
in various ways traceable to the valid law under which they arise. Of 
course, valid law also has material content, i.e., it is informed by sub-
stantive considerations, which in tum inform the content of the formal 
legal reasons arising under valid law.25 As we have seen, authorita-
tiveness might be exclusively formal, as when the validity of the law 
under which the reason arises is attributable solely to the operation of 
source-oriented (content-independent) standards of validity, such as 
due adoption by a legislative body. But even when legal validity is also 
attributable to putative law's conformity with substantive standards of 
legal validity, the authoritativeness of the law so validated remains 
partly attributable to source- oriented, and so formal, standards too. 
(Many provisions of our federal constitution embody such substantive 
standards. 26) 
Merely substantive reasons are those a judge or other official or 
party concerned with the law invokes in light of applicable moral 
norms or policy analysis. Substantive reasons are moral, economic, 
political, or other social considerations that do not derive from valid 
law, and so lack authoritative formality at the time they are invoked. 
Hence they are not as such authoritative, and so are not formal legal 
reasons at all. 
"Validity formality" - that variety of formality that derives from 
compliance of putative law with merely source- oriented standards of 
validity - necessarily pervades the law. The rationales justifying this 
kind of formality are among the most fundamental of all, and include 
the very legitimacy of the law, freedom and autonomy of lawmakers, 
considerations ranging from democracy to institutional competence, 
and various "rule of law" values. Again, it will not do here to pro-
claim: "I am not a formalist," as if the law could dispense with such 
formal authoritativeness. 
Of course, the material content of putative law so validated and the 
25. See generally P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 141. 
26. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend I. 
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legal reasons arising under it may not be substantively very good. 
Thus, the reasoning of a higher court adhering to substantively objec-
tionable common law on the ground of its formal authoritativeness 
may, at least if the case is extreme enough, be criticized as formalistic, 
given that such a court has power to overrule. Similarly, a nomiative 
legal theory requiring such adherence may be criticized as formalistic. 
In effect, the critic here would be urging that the fusion of authorita-
tive formality with substance in the existing law is so objectionable 
that the court should invoke its power to overrule. Once again, a type 
of formality is at work here - the authoritativeness of precedent com-
bined with the formal principle of stare decisis - that in appropriate 
circumstances generates legally compelling formal reasons. 27 
Overformality in the form of excessive regard for the formal au-
thoritativeness of substantively bad case law is hardly the only variety 
of the formalistic in legal reasoning. Another species is excessive re-
gard for coherence, consistency, and congruence of decision with ante-
cedent case law, where that law is not really very closely analogous. 
Here the variety of formality in the background that has gone awry is, 
of course, coherence, consistency, and congruence itself. But simply 
because it goes awry in some instances does not justify proclaiming "I 
am not a formalist" and dispensing in legal reasoning with coherence, 
consistency, and congruence. Powerful substantive rationales lie be-
hind consistency of decision with antecedent case law.28 
Many theorists view "conceptualism" as the most common formal-
istic vice in legal reasoning. Judge Posner characterizes this vice as 
the practice of reasoning to and from concepts merely as a "system of 
relations among ideas" without regard to "consequences in the world 
of fact" (p. 16). An example might be Langdell's refusal to find a 
contract where the party claiming an offered reward did the acts con-
templated by the offer (for example, turning over lost goods) without 
knowledge of the offer. Langdell argued there was no contract be-
cause the party claiming the reward could not have "accepted," in that 
an acceptance conceptually requires conscious action , (p. 250). A 
nonformalistic judge, Judge Posner tells us, would look to the conse-
quences of liability - for example, whether more lost goods would be 
found - and decide accordingly (pp. 251-52). Whether or not this is 
an apt example of the overconceptual, and thus of the formalistic, it 
certainly implicates an appropriate variety of formality, namely the 
conceptual component of the particular doctrine. Again, we could not 
dispense with this type of formality. Here the rationales for formality 
are rock bottom. If we were to "cleanse" our law of all concepts, there 
27. Judge Posner at times appears to reject this. At the very least, he is ambivalent. See pp. 
135, 139, 140, 142, 249; see also infra Part IV. 
28. Judge Posner would certainly agree, though he does not so conceptualize matters. See, 
e.g., p. 249. 
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could be no law. Here, to assert "I am not a formalist," yet affirm the 
existence of law, would literally make no sense.29 
* * * 
For every true version of the "formalistic," there must be a corre-
spondingly appropriate version of legal formality; the appropriate level 
of justified legal formality is determined by various general rationales 
in interaction with problem-specific considerations. Yet appropriate 
formality in the law, in its numerous varieties, does not get due credit 
in American jurisprudence. Usually, formality is not recognized for 
what it is. Instead, preoccupied with the substantive side of the law, 
American theorists neglect the varieties of appropriate formality and 
their rationales, and overuse the epithets "formalistic" and "formal-
ism." They are also insufficiently sensitive to the underformal - that 
is, to the "oversubstantive" in our law. Indeed, the vocabulary of 
American theorists does not yet even include the term precisely paral-
lel to "formalistic" for use in criticizing the oversubstantive in our law: 
"substantivistic." Yet if our system tends to err more heavily on one 
side than on the other, it probably tends to be oversubstantive, rather 
than overformal.30 If! am right, Judge Posner's own theories of statu-
tory interpretation and precedent might be criticized as "substantivis-
tic." I will, among other things, explain how so in the next two 
sections. 
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Judge Posner does not have a comprehensive general theory of 
statutory interpretation, positive or normative.31 He does not even ad-
29. Judge Posner, of course. makes room for concepts. What he does not acknowledge is 
their formal character. 
30. See Summers, Theory, supra note 13, at 408-09. 
31. The main questions in such a normative theory include: (1) Why have a normative the-
ory in the first place? (2) From what sources do issues of interpretation arise? (3) What are the 
leading types ofinterpretative arguments? (4) How are such arguments to be differentiated? (5) 
What is the nature and force of each type of argument? (6) What further is to be learned by 
subclassifying the various types of arguments under a more limited set of general categories, e.g., 
linguistic, systemic, teleological- evaluative, intentional? (7) Which types of arguments are most 
likely to produce the same decisional outcomes under the same statute at the hands of different 
interpreters? (8) Which arguments are formal and which not? (9) How are conflicts between 
such arguments generally to be resolved, and why? (10) In addition to "weighing and balanc-
ing," what other basic modes of resolving conflicts between arguments are there? (11) What is 
the relative overall role of each leading type of argument within the system, considering the 
extent of its availability and its relative decisiveness? (12) How far is it possible to construct 
useful general models of the best possible overall justifications for the resolution of relatively 
discrete and basic interpretational problems such as ambiguity, vagueness, overgenerality, un-
dergenerality, gaps, conflicts between statutes, obsolescence, and legislative mistakes? How do 
any resulting models differ and why? (13) How far can law govern the nature and force of 
interpretive arguments and the resolution of conflicts between them? How far does law govern 
them? (14) What is the appropriate style and structure of judicial opinions in statutory interpre-
tation cases? (15) How far is interpretation a matter of factual inquiry and how far is it a matter 
of evaluation? See generally D. MACCORMICK & R. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING STATUTES -A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (forthcoming 1991). 
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dress all of the leading types of arguments that figure in statutory in-
terpretation. Nor does he single out any one leading type of argument 
and systematically treat its various facets. And he does not explore 
the various ways courts resolve conflicts benyeen arguments. In all 
this, perhaps he is hardly to be faulted. The theory of the entire sub-
ject is still in its infancy (despite much promising literature of late). 
Judge Posner vigorously attacks the linguistic "plain-meaning" ar-
gument (although without defining it very closely) (pp. 262-302). 
Here, too, he joins most American academics and many judges. On 
the other hand, he admits that communication thmµgh the written 
word is often successful (p. 295). He also indicates that in his view the 
plain meaning argument has a "valid core," and he enjoins judges not 
to "be too quick to override the apparent meaning" (p. 280). But he 
does not develop these points, and one is left with the overall impres-
sion that he has relatively little faith in argumentation that is largely 
linguistic, and thus in this sense formal. While he is willing to turn to 
purposive arguments (pp. 267, 274), to arguments from intention 
rooted in legislative history (pp. 104, 262), and to interpretive argu-
ments of still other types, his heart is not in these specific types of 
arguments, either. 
While his overall normative approach cannot be reduced to a sin-
gle argument, he does try to encapsulate his approach in this sentence: 
"Maybe the best thing to do when a statute is invoked is to examine 
the consequences of giving the invoker what he wants and then esti-
mate whether those consequences will on the whole be good ones" (p. 
300). He qualifies this, and stresses that judges should not ignore the 
formal language of the statute; but he does not develop this approach 
systematically, either.32 He prefers "the interpretation that has, all 
things considered, the better consequences," which "may by virtue of 
that fact be the 'correct' interpretation" (p. 105). For Judge Posner, 
the "better consequences" to be considered certainly include the sub-
stantively best result on the merits. Judge Posner's overall approach 
downplays the formal language of the statute. It is not merely sub-
stantive. It may even be oversubstantive, i.e., "substantivistic," for 
while Judge Posner does not ignore the formally authoritative text, he 
strongly embraces a substantive and consequentialist justificatory 
ethic. This priority comes out not only in his emphasis on the substan-
tive consequences of alternative interpretations but also in his vigorous 
32. The fullest general statement appears at p. 300 and is as follows: 
This approach, which is pragmatic, does not justify, much less entail, ignoring the text. 
Not only is the text a source of information about the consequences of alternative "interpre-
tations," but among the consequences to be considered is the impact that unpredictable 
statutory applications will have on communication between legislature and court. Nor-
mally, indeed, if communicative intent or legislative purpose can be discerned - in other 
words, if imaginative reconstruction works - that will be the end of the case. 
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rejection of "plain meaning" argumentation. 33 
Statutes are generally formulated in words: ordinary, technical, or 
both. Ordinary words may have ordinary meanings or technical 
meanings Oegal or nonlegal) or special meanings. Technical words 
may have technical meanings Oegal or nonlegal) or special meanings. 
A court's ultimate interpretive conclusion, then, may look to (1) ordi-
nary meaning, or (2) technical meaning, or (3) special meaning,34 or 
may take the form of (4) a decision in which the court assigns a clari-
fied meaning to the statute (as, for example, where a statute is ellipti-
cal), or (5) simply a decision in which the court makes it all up largely 
from scratch. The fourth of these qualifies to some extent as a genuine 
interpretive conclusion; the fifth hardly qualifies at all. The line be-
tween (1), (2), and (3) on the one hand, and (4) on the other, may not 
be sharp. The line between (4) and (5) definitely is not sharp. 
The above five interpretive conclusions might be supported by lin-
guistic, systemic, teleological, intentional, and evaluative arguments.35 
My primary interest here is in the linguistic, though, as we will see, the 
materials out of which such arguments are appropriately constructed 
are not confined to the bare text alone. 
At least three types of linguistic arguments should be distin-
guished: the first is the argument from an ordinary meaning of ordi-
nary words; the second is the argument from a technical meaning of 
ordinary or technical words; and the third is the argument from a spe-
cial meaning of ordinary or technical words based not only on the 
words in question but on how they are used in other parts of the sec-
tion of the statute involved, in other sections of the statute, and in 
closely related statutes. One may call this third type a coherence or 
harmonization argument. A prima facie forceful argument from ordi-
nary meaning might be canceled or displaced by evidence of a techni-
cal meaning (which might include, for example, resort to history of the 
term in the law), or might be canceled or displaced by a special mean-
ing deriving from harmonization with the rest of the statute. On the 
other hand, this third type of argument might also reinforce the inter-
pretive conclusion supported by an argument from an ordinary mean-
ing or an argument from a technical meaning. 
Judge Posner sometimes uses the phrase, "plain meaning," not so 
much to designate one (or more) types of meaning in the senses above 
as to refer to a kind of judgment in the particular instance that the 
meaning of the statute is plain. Now, the interpretive conclusion that 
33. Judge Posner's criticisms are hardly idiosyncratic. The American academic literature on 
statutory interpretation is replete with them. 
34. By special meaning, I mean either (1) a meaning different from an ordinary meaning of 
an ordinary word, and at the same time a meaning that is not yet an established technical mean· 
ing of that ordinary word, or (2) a meaning of a technical word that is not the technical meaning 
of that technical word. 
35. See generally D. MACCORMICK & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, at 512-25. 
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is thus "plain" could be an ordinary meaning, or a technical meaning 
(legal or nonlegal), or a special meaning, or perhaps even a "clarified" 
meaning, as above. When the interpretive conclusion is an ordinary 
meaning of ordinary words, the interpreter will usually seek to support 
this conclusion by an appeal to ordinary language. Of course, other 
types of argument might be invoked to support this conclusion, too, 
including the argument from coherence with other parts of the statute, 
and the argument from ultimate statutory purpose. Again, other types 
of arguments might conflict with the argument from ordinary mean-
ing, as well. Most of Judge Posner's assault is addressed, directly or 
indirectly, to what I call the argument from ordinary meaning, and 
does not apply to what I call the argument from technical meaning or 
to the argument from statutory harmonization in support of a special 
meaning. 
The argument from ordinary meaning is exceedingly complex, and 
Judge Posner is correct to say that its deployment is not merely a mat-
ter of knowing how to use a dictionary or how to consult a grammar 
book. The argument takes some account of context and postulates a 
competent and informed user of ordinary language. It also acknowl-
edges the legislative purposes. That is, it takes account of the purposes 
that a competent and informed user of those words could be said to 
have had in using them in the general circumstances involved. The 
argument does not, however, simply collapse into the independent ar-
gument from that interpretation which would best serve the ultimate 
statutory purpose. I will not now, however, attempt to develop and 
characterize the entire positive structure and content of the argument 
from ordinary meaning, or attempt to differentiate it from other 
nonlinguistic types of arguments. Instead, I turn to the Posnerian as-
saults on the argument from ordinary meaning - assaults that, I may 
add, occur against a background of increasing resort to the argument 
by the Supreme Court. 36 
Judge Posner does not flatly affirm that the argument from ordi-
nary meaning cannot consistently serve values appropriate to statutory 
interpretation. Yet at numerous points he appears highly skeptical 
(pp. 262-302). In my view, the argument from ordinary meaning, 
when appropriately in play, serves relevant interpretational values, 
and thus has general justificatory force of its own. I have already indi-
cated that the argument from ordinary meaning may be viewed largely 
as textual and therefore formal, especially when contrasted with Judge 
Posner's substantive consequentialism. The values that the ordinary 
meaning argument serves might also be conceptualized as rationales 
for interpretive formality. 
36. See. e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146 (1989); Commissioner v. 
Asphalt Prods. Co., 482 U.S. 117, 120 (1987); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985); 
Griffen v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982). 
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Perhaps most obvious, the argument from ordinary meaning serves 
the values of legitimacy in lawmaking, and of representative democ-
racy. As the Supreme Court has stressed, "Congressmen typically 
vote on the language of a bill,"37 and that language is often ordinary 
language. Certainly the members of the legislature and the legislative 
drafters can be assumed to know and understand the English language 
and the ordinary usage of English words. Relatedly, the argument 
from ordinary meaning is hardly in itself purposeless or intentless. A 
proposition the Supreme Court frequently cites is this: "[W]e must, of 
course, start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is ex-
pressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used."38 
At the same time, judicial adherence to the ordinary meaning of 
ordinary words in the statute may encourage the legislature to legislate 
more explicitly and thereby discourage "legislation" hidden in mere 
committee reports and the like, "legislation" which may well not have 
gained true democratic assent and legitimacy if more explicit language 
had been used in the statutory text. 39 Such "hidden legislation" is all 
the more objectionable because most members of Congress do not see 
committee reports and the like, and because it excludes or diminishes 
the role of the executive in the lawmaking process. The President 
signs only the bill that Congress presents to the President.40 
Judicial adherence to the relevant ordinary meanings of ordinary 
words can also operate to encourage careful drafting and thus serve 
not only legitimacy and democracy but also the values specific to the 
rule of law. Among other things, the legislative drafter will know that 
any intended departures from what would otherwise be the ordinary 
meaning must be made clear in the final draft of the statute.41 
Furthermore, the institutional competence of courts to make full-
scale legislative judgments about ends and means is itself limited. In 
following the dictates of the argument from the ordinary meaning of 
the statutory words, the court may avoid the necessity of making com-
plex legislative judgments about the reasonableness of ultimate pur-
poses and about the suitability of means. 42 At the same time, judicial 
adherence to the ordinary meaning of ordinary words in the statute 
restricts the opportunity for strong-willed judges to substitute their 
own personal political views for those of the legislature with respect to 
ends and means. 43 This value is relatively neutral. A wilful judge may 
37. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985). 
38. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. l, 9 (1962). 
39. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
40. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 345; Wallace v. Christenson, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
41. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 285 n.10 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
42. See TVA. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978). 
43. See Commissioner v. Asphalt Prods., Inc., 482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987). 
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be of virtually any political hue: left, right, or other. 
One further value (of many) that adherence to ordinary meaning 
can serve is the protection of reliance on published law, and thus, 
again, the rule of law itself. In following ordinary meaning, the court 
may be (and often will be) protecting the interests of those citizens 
who appropriately relied on such meaning. To subject them to a spe-
cial meaning based on unenacted legislative history may be to jerk the 
rug from beneath them. This is not only unfair, but disserves the rule 
of law as well. 44 
According to a second species of skepticism about the argument 
from ordinary meaning, the argument is inherently (or at least typi-
cally) question-begging.45 If true, the argument from ordinary mean-
ing could not have general justificatory force. In my view, the charge 
is false. The charge may arise because of the way the argument is 
presented. Judges often make the argument in highly abbreviated 
terms without offering any grounds or subsidiary argumentation that 
the words really do have the ordinary meaning that the interpreter 
attributes to them. Yet, there is plainly much scope for subsidiary 
argumentation in support of (or opposed to) a conclusion that the stat-
ute has a given ordinary meaning. The overall process of marshaling 
subsidiary argumentation to support such an interpretive conclusion 
can be quite multifaceted. 
The subsidiary argumentation to which I refer consists of argu-
ments that may support a given ordinary meaning not merely over a 
competing ordinary meaning (as where the word has several ordinary 
meanings) but also over a possible technical meaning, or over a possi-
ble special meaning, or indeed, over no general type of meening at all 
but merely over a decision as to the application of the statute. The 
interpreter may begin with a list of possible ordinary meanings that 
the word or words in issue might have. Is the claimed ordinary mean-
ing one of those? Is it recognized in a good dictionary? Is the claimed 
ordinary meaning as used in the statute consistent with applicable 
rules of grammar? If the answers here are "yes," they obviously pro-
vide some subsidiary argumentation supporting the claimed interpre-
tive conclusion that the statutory meaning is this ordinary meaning. 
The general context of use also generates subsidiary argumentation 
that rules out some of the many meanings of a word. For example, the 
word "draw" has many dictionary meanings, but where the word ap-
pears in a statute dealing with the drawing of checks the general con-
text of use makes obvious that other meanings are irrelevant. 
Would a competent ordinary user of the words in circumstances 
parallel to those of the statutory draftsman mean the ordinary mean-
44. See Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 131-33 (1983). 
45. Judge Posner attacks the ordinary meaning argument on this general ground. Seep. 263. 
There are several ways to interpret "question-begging" here. I consider only two in the text. 
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ing of the words? If so, this too would provide a subsidiary argument. 
An ordinary meaning presupposes standard circumstances of use rec-
ognizable by the competent user of the language. One has to be able to 
say to oneself: "In circumstances X, if I wish to convey ordinary 
meaning A, then I should use form of words M." When those circum-
stances are present, then ordinary meaning A of the words M would, 
without more, be appropriately attributed to the legislative drafter. 
The circumstances appropriate to use of the word in issue may or may 
not be present. Thus, a supporting subsidiary argument may or may 
not be generated, depending on the circumstances. This mode of sub-
sidiary argumentation might be recast in terms of standard purposes of 
language users. Ordinary meanings of words presuppose standard 
purposes to convey just those meanings, and these purposes can be 
defined in terms of appropriate circumstances of usage. 
A further variety of subsidiary argumentation in support of attrib-
uting a given ordinary meaning to statutory words is simply that this 
meaning is the one that best coheres substantively with the apparent 
meanings of the rest of the words in the statutory phrase, sentence, or 
paragraph, considered as a linguistic unit within ordinary language. 
Still another type of subsidiary argument takes the specific form of 
ruling out competing technical or special meanings for an ordinary 
word in light of special knowledge of facts about the matters in ques-
tion that make it appropriate to rule those meanings out. 
The foregoing analysis is hardly exhaustive, yet it demonstrates 
that the argument from ordinary meaning is not inherently question-
begging or "conclusory." When the general argument from ordinary 
meaning is in play, subsidiary arguments can usually be given to sup-
port a conclusion that the appropriate interpretation consists of a 
given ordinary meaning. 
Nevertheless, the charge that the argument from ordinary meaning 
is, if not inherently, then at least not infrequently question-begging 
may still survive. Construed differently, the charge might be that the 
interpreter, by ignoring any sources of unclarity external to the lan-
guage of the statute, begs the question as to any issue of meaning that 
arises only if these external sources of unclarity are taken into account. 
One of Judge Posner's examples here is well known: 
The statute said that a bequest in a will complying with specified formal-
ities was enforceable. There was no ambiguity until one brought in from 
outside the fact that the person named in the bequest had murdered the 
author of the will .... [The] plain-meaning approach rules out argu-
ments of external ambiguity, and by doing so artificially truncates the 
interpretive process.46 
46. P. 264. This "old jurisprudential chestnut" is also discussed at pp. 105-06. For another 
example, see p. 269 (a military radio message, technically incomplete, with clear implicit 
meaning). 
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But in my view, the argument from ordinary meaning presupposes 
that the interpreter knows and appropriately takes into account at 
least the essential facts of the case giving rise to the question whether 
the statutory language applies. Further, the interpreter should recog-
nize the limits to human foresight, and also recognize that some things 
may be taken for granted in communicating through ordinary lan-
guage. 47 Indeed, if nothing could ever be taken for granted in the use 
of ordinary language, that language would lose much of its utility: 
These points are relevant to Judge Posner's example, in which the is-
sue of interpretation cannot even be seen for what it is unless the facts 
of the case - the legatee murdered the testator - are taken into ac-
count. The case is precisely one raising a question of possible statu-
tory overgenerality in which the court, in the absence of anything 
more specific, must reason about what a legislature in using ordinary 
language may reasonably be considered to have taken for granted. 
One line of reasoning would be that, in light of widely accepted moral 
principles, the legislature took it for granted that a court would as-
sume the legislature did not mean to reward murderers. Perhaps 
Judge Posner himself adopts truncated conceptions of ordinary lan-
guage and of the process of communication through ordinary language 
when he says the argument from ordinary meaning cannot itself take 
account of such an "external" fact as that the legatee murdered the 
testator.48 
Those skeptical about the ordinary meaning argument might raise 
yet a third basic question: Because of change, obsolescence, ambiguity 
(both internal and external), vagueness, ellipses, the plurality of lin-
guistic communities, and other possible sources of linguistic unclarity, 
are the conditions required by the argument from ordinary meaning so 
rare that this mode of argument can be at best only a minor justifica-
tory resource in the interpretation of statutes? Judge Posner seems to 
assume as much.49 Yet he also concedes that communication through 
ordinary language is often successful (pp. 293-96). Perhaps he thinks 
that when a legislative drafter picks up a pen, clear communication 
through ordinary language tends more often than not to stop. It is 
true that appellate judges have a steady diet of cases in which sources 
of unclarity in statutes do materialize. Yet appellate judges frequently 
rely on the argument from ordinary meaning, the Supreme Court in-
47. I do not see why Judge Posner should disagree with this. See his emphasis on "unspoken 
understandings" at p. 294. 
48. Even if Judge Posner is not unduly truncating the argument from ordinary meaning (and 
I believe he is), it still would not necessarily follow that his example demonstrates that an argu-
ment from the language alone would be question-begging. So long as reasons with some force 
could be given for having the interpreter focus solely on the authoritative language, the question 
would not be begged. 
49. See chs. 9-10. Judge Posner gives special emphasis to change and obsolescence, and in 
my view greatly overemphasizes these. I believe ambiguity and vagueness are more common. 
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creasingly so.50 Additionally, in many statutes, language and commu-
nicative assumptions pose few or no issues of interpretation. These 
statutes are cast largely in ordinary language. I am prepared to as-
sume that one reason these statutes pose few or no issues is simply that 
judges, practicing lawyers, and others accept the argument from ordi-
nary meaning as determinative under such statutes. If I am correct, 
the argument is a major rather than a minor justificatory resource in 
statutory interpretation, outside and inside courts. 
Fourth, Judge Posner sometimes appears to assume that, to be a 
significant or truly viable general mode of interpretive argument, the 
argument from ordinary meaning must always prevail over competing 
arguments (p. 264). Without doubt, the argument from ordinary 
meaning may be canceled by a competing argument from technical 
meaning, or by an argument from harmonization with other parts of 
the statute. Also, the argument from ordinary meaning may be over-
ridden by the argument from ultimate statutory purpose, or by still 
other competing interpretive arguments.51 Moreover, the argument 
from ordinary meaning is subject to limiting exceptions. For example, 
it generally loses its force when it generates a manifestly absurd or 
manifestly unjust result. Or, to cite a second example, where the ordi-
nary meaning of implementing language is overgeneral in relation to 
its facial statutory purpose, the ordinary meaning will often be cut 
back to fit that purpose. Points of this nature, however, also apply to 
all the other leading types of interpretational arguments. If, to qualify 
as an important mode of argumentation, an argument must always 
prevail when appropriately in play, no type of interpretive argument 
would be important. No single type of interpretive argument, when 
appropriately in play, always prevails. 
Furthermore, we must be wary of minimizing the true place of the 
argument from ordinary meaning by exaggerating the size of the cate-
gory of cases in which it fails to prevail. Cases in which the conditions 
for the availability of the argument are not present in the first place 
should not be included in this category. These conditions are not re-
ally present when, for example, the statute is poorly drafted, or the 
statute is plainly obsolete or outmoded, or the language is highly 
vague.52 
In my view, Judge Posner does not give the argument from ordi-
nary meaning its just due. If I am right, this argument is the primary 
justificatory resource in statutory interpretation. There is much about 
50. See cases cited supra note 36. 
51. See D. MACCORMICK & R. SUMMERS, supra note 31, at 479-86. In this forthcoming 
book, we also develop the argument that American theorists much overdo "weighing and balanc-
ing" as a mode of settling conflicts between interpretational arguments. Judges invoke other 
important modes, too, including cancelation and priorital overriding. 
52. But see pp. 267-69 (discussing United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985)). 
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the argument that we do not yet fully understand, but this state of 
affairs is likely to be remedied in the next decade. 
V. PRECEDENT 
Again, Judge Posner does not seek to provide a comprehensive 
general theory of precedent, either positive or normative. 53 Indeed, it 
is difficult to know exactly what Judge Posner's theory is. His ap-
proach to precedent, like his theory of statutory interpretation, is frag-
mentary and unsystematic. And there is deep tension between various 
positions he takes. In very general terms, perhaps the most fundamen-
tal choice here is whether (1) the judge is to follow precedent in rule-
like fashion, or (2) the judge is to determine on a case-by-case basis 
whether to follow any given precedent, almost as if every case were 
one of first impression, with precedent only a "factor to be weighed" 
in the overall decisional process. Judge Posner says several things that 
point toward the former. From time to time he acknowledges that 
binding precedents squarely on point really do exist (pp. 94-95, 132-
33, 455-56). Moreover, he acknowledges that following precedent is a 
content-independent principle (and thus, in my terms, a formal princi-
ple) that generates a "reason apart from its [substantive] sound-
ness .... "54 In tum, Judge Posner identifies a variety of rationales that 
justify the general practice of following precedent, including, of 
course, "stability" (pp. 94, 98, 118, 119, 260). He also refers to the 
"limited license" of judges to change the rules in mid-course (p. 50). 
Yet, at other moments, he sounds very different, and seems even to 
embrace a kind of ad hoc approach in which the judge (at least the 
higher appellate judge) is, in every case, to weigh and balance whether 
to follow precedent, viewing precedent as merely one "factor" in the 
overall decisional process: 
Admittedly it is a legal convention - though one not fully shared by 
the rest of the community or even by the entire legal profession - that a 
decision foursquare in accord with a recent decision by the highest court 
of the jurisdiction is "correct" by virtue of its conformity to authority. 
But it is a weak convention. [p. 80] · 
53. The questions in a general nonnative theory of precedent include the following: (1) Why 
should we have such a normative theory in the first place? (2) How is the principle of stare 
decisis to be formulated, and in what sense is it a formal principle? (3) What are the rationales 
behind the formal principle of stare decisis? (4) When is a precedent to be considered settled 
law? What factors rationally figure in this judgment? (5) What factors may rationally under-
mine a once-settled precedent? (6) Within a precedent, what is holding and what is dictum? (7) 
On what courts is a precedent binding? (8) What court can overrule a precedent? What norms 
govern the exercise of a power to overrule, and how are they to be formulated? (9) What are the 
appropriate interactions between statutes and precedents? Contract terms and precedents? Con-
stitutions and precedents? 
54. P. 260. Posner adds that there is "no social interest in continuity or a smooth fit, as such, 
between successive cases." P. 260. But cf. p. 81 (discussing "the political foundations of 
precedent"). 
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The later court decides whether to read the earlier decision 
broadly or narrowly and, if it cannot be narrowed sufficiently to distin-
guish the present case, whether to overrule it. That court has the power, 
and it also has more information, just by virtue of coming later. The 
decision of how much weight to give the earlier precedent - whether to 
apply it at all, and if so how broadly - is a pragmatic decision in which 
the uncertainty that will be created by a too casual attitude toward past 
decisions - and the additional work that such an attitude will create for 
the courts both by requiring more time on each case and, as a result of 
the greater uncertainty, engendering more cases - are compared with 
the increased risk of error that an uncritical view of past decisions will 
create. [p. 98] 
. . . . Fidelity to precedent is just another consideration - another 
policy or principle - to be placed in the balance in deciding whether a 
particular outcome would be a suitable means to the judicial end. So far, 
so good. [p.107; footnote omitted] 
. . . . The order in law is of decisions by lawyers' committees that we 
call appellate courts, and these decisions frequently are ill informed, out-
moded, or ignoble. The obeisance that judges owe them depends on the 
intrinsic merit of the previous decisions, which is variable, and on the 
balance between the claims of stability and of substantive justice. [p.261] 
From these and still other passages,55 it would appear that Judge 
Posner believes a judge (at least of a higher appellate court) should be 
free to determine on a case-by-case basis whether to depart from any 
and all precedents. Judge Posner does not even appear to require a 
strong prima facie showing that the precedent is itself substantively 
unsound to trigger the full-scale inquiry into whether the precedent 
should be overruled. If this is his view, then every precedent becomes 
a candidate for overruling, and every case becomes a kind of case of 
first impression. And instead of precedent generating a genuine for-
mal reason for decision (p. 260), it simply becomes a factor to be 
weighed (p. 107). Stare decisis is at most a "tug" at the judge's elbow 
(p. 90). The distinction between holding and dictum, then, is not at all 
hard and fast; rather, it is made largely on the basis of "policy" (pp. 
96-97). 
Judge Posner believes that most American judges are preoccupied 
with precedent as formal authority for decisions (p. 97). At the same 
time, he frequently approaches the other extreme. His own normative 
theory of precedent, like his normative theory of statutory interpreta-
tion, is highly substantive. Indeed, it may even be substantivistic. 
That is, it may be underformal in the respect that it fails to accord 
55. See, e.g., p. 455 ("judges are compelled to fall back on the grab bag of informal methods 
of reasoning that I call 'practical reason' "). 
May 1991] Posner's Jurisprudence 1327 
sufficient force to the formal principle of stare decisis and thus to the 
various rationales behind that principle. 56 In nearly all of the above 
passages, Judge Posner even appears to accord relatively little weight 
to the efficiency that goes with regarding most precedents as settled 
law rather than as decisions always subject to full reexamination. He 
also fails to acknowledge that on many legal questions on which there 
is precedent, the force of substantive reason on each side is more or 
less in equipoise or at least not clearly in favor of one outcome, so that 
the "resolutive" function of precedent in such cases accordingly takes 
on special significance. s1 
VI. LAW'S AUTONOMY 
One of Judge Posner's most general theses is that law has relatively 
little autonomy.58 I have deferred this topic until now because my 
commentary on this thesis must inevitably draw on what I have dis-
cussed above. Judge Posner really has a dual thesis. First, he thinks 
that law, as a social phenomenon, is highly dependent on other, nonle-
gal, sources for its substantive content and, presumably, for its re-
quired social acceptance and for its modes of applicational analysis. 
Second, he thinks that law, as an academic discipline, is highly depen-
dent on other disciplines for facts and values relevant to law's evalua-
tion and improvement, for models of legal reasoning, and for ways of 
studying law and its workings. 
Neither branch of this dual thesis is new. Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr., Roscoe Pound, and numerous others subscribed to such views long 
ago. What is perhaps most notable in recent times is the acceptance in 
the law schools of economics as a discipline of relevance to law, a 
development in which Judge Posner himself has had a very large hand. 
Still, I cannot agree with Judge Posner that even economics has ••rav-
ished" law or legal education. 59 Indeed, the actual impact of econom-
ics on the positive content of specific legal doctrines has, on the whole, 
not been very great. At the same time, in the law schools today, schol-
ars and students are also more receptive than ever before to instruction 
56. Perhaps one factor driving his overall view is his low estimate of the substantive quality 
of precedent in our system. Evidence of such an estimate appears at pp. 94, 240, 261 & 445. 
57. Judge Posner omits in his book any reference to several of the standard rationales for 
precedent other than "stability" and the like. For example, he does not take up Professor 
Fuller's point that precedent, as a form of antecedent law, serves as a major source of those 
standards on which truly effective adjudication is dependent. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 372-81 (1978). 
58. Yet at one point he does write of the "essential characteristics of the legal enterprise." P. 
455. 
59. P. 442. For a systematic evaluation, see Summers & Kelley, 'Economists' Reasons' for 
Common Law Decisions -A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (1981). (This 
article, alas, was never indexed in the Index to Legal Periodicals. Nor were any articles in the 
first few issues of this journal.) 
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from all academic fields that bear on law - philosophy, history, soci-
ology, political science, literature, and more. 
Judge Posner sees several implications of the "new" dependence of 
law on other disciplines. I will confine myself to two of those. First, 
he occasionally suggests that this dependency signifies that both law as 
a social phenomenon and law as a traditional academic discipline are 
in pretty bad shape. He implies that we really cannot have a "thrilling 
vision" of law, given its dependent, parasitic, and servile status (p. 
460). In the same vein, he suggests that, given the dependency of aca-
demic law on other disciplines, traditional academic lawyers could be 
thought of as "mere water bearers and hod carriers of theorists from 
other disciplines" (p. 437). The second, and the most obvious practi-
cal implication for Judge Posner, is simply that law, and so academic 
lawyers, must turn to other sources and disciplines for the facts and 
values relevant to the content of law, and even for appropriate models 
of applicational legal reasoning. 
In response, one may say that, if law as a social phenomenon and 
academic law are in pretty bad shape because of this dependency, then 
so too are the economy as a social phenomenon and academic eco-
nomics. Nearly everything Judge Posner says about law and academic 
law is also true of the economy, and of academic economics (at least in 
its normative facets). Indeed, matters are even worse. The economy 
as a social phenomenon is deeply and in manifold ways dependent on 
the social phenomenon of law. Normative economics, as an academic 
discipline, is dependent on a theory of value deriving from philosophy. 
And the policy prescriptions generated by normative economics and 
philosophy must inevitably undergo significant transformation on the 
anvil of law prior to any legal implementation. 60 Indeed, a "raw" pol-
icy prescription, even though otherwise sound, may not even be sus-
ceptible of reliable legal implementation and thus may have to be 
abandoned altogether. What an unthrilling vision all this must be for 
champions of the autonomy of the economy and the autonomy of nor-
mative economics! 
Obviously, lawyers must learn from economics (and other disci-
plines) in making and applying law, and in studying and teaching law. 
But this state of dependency can be overstated, too, and I believe 
Judge Posner is guilty of overstatement. 61 • 
The relative autonomy of law and academic law can be easily illus-
trated. First, law is not, in large measure, dependent on other phe-
nomena, or on other fields of academic study for answers to the 
60. See generally Summers, Some Considerations Which May Lead Law Makers to Modify a 
Policy When Adopting It as Law, 141 ZElTSCHRlFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 
41-42 (1985) (discussing various desiderata, including having law take the form of rules and be 
intelligible, " 'factually' administrable," and "appropriately prospective"). 
61. Judge Posner occasionally offers a qualification, but one wonders whether he is really 
serious. See p. 434 ("No field is completely autonomous .... ") 
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question: What are the essential elements of a system of law? An-
swers to this basic defining question are to be found emergent in the 
subject matter of law itself, and these answers have an integrity and 
complexity of their own. Second, once the elements of a legal system 
are in place, the law of that system, and not other things, regulates the 
creation of statutes, precedents, custom, and other forms of law. As 
Hans Kelsen emphasized, law largely regulates its own creation. 62 
Third, not every statute, precedent, or other species oflaw is signif-
icantly dependent for its rational substantive content on the findings 
and teachings of other disciplines such as economics or sociology. 
Much of our law does not require or presuppose values or empirically 
verified generalizations beyond the resources of intelligent common 
sense, the humanist tradition, and the requisites of legal implementa-
tion. This is true, for example, of that core of the criminal law and of 
those parts of civil law that track widely accepted moral norms. To 
cite only one more example, most written law consists not of statutes 
but of contracts, and most contracts are not dependent in a substantive 
way on the resources of other disciplines. 
Fourth, with regard to the content of all statutes, all precedents, 
and all species of law, formal considerations of a distinctively legal 
kind play a major role. Constitutive formality, validity formality, con-
tinuity formality, close-ended formality, expressional formality, and 
fiat formality63 are, in light of their various rationales, fused with the 
substance of particular statutes, precedents, and other law. These 
(and still other) varieties of formality, all of which derive from "inside 
the law," shape the contours oflaw's material content and also render 
it fit for legal implementation. 
Fifth, the methods that lawyers and judges apply in interpreting 
statutes and in following precedent are more distinctive than Judge 
Posner allows. For example, arguments from the ordinary or techni-
cal meaning of statutory words, from harmonization with the rest of 
the statute and with related statutes, and from ultimate statutory pur-
pose often involve systematic analysis and sophistication more or less 
special to law. The same is true of much reasoning about binding pre-
cedent. We must be wary of the exceptionally able ex-law professor 
who is disposed to take much for granted here. One hardly knows 
where to begin. The skills of sound distinguishing, reconciling, and 
synthesizing of precedents are highly refined in the law. The differen-
tiation of settled precedent from that which is not yet settled is no 
simple matter in our system, and has little by way of counterpart 
outside the law. Nor is the identification of what is authoritative in a 
62. H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE (A. Wedberg trans. 1943). 
63. See supra text accompanying notes 17-30. 
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precedent a simple matter with no distinctive complexities. 64 Identify-
ing what is authoritative in a precedent may even require sophisticated 
doctrinal history (including inquiry into the sequence in which cases 
have arisen). What existing precedents "stand for" is in part a matter 
of how they have come to be. An ahistoric discipline such as econom-
ics can tell us almost nothing about this. 65 
Of course, the scope for all this technique is partly determined by 
what the judges of the system collectively permit. If judges were to 
choose, as a normative matter, to play fast and loose with precedents 
(or statutes), the law would be far less determinative, and judges 
would be forced to fall back on what Judge Posner refers to as the 
"grab bag" of informal methods of "practical reason" when applying 
law (p. 455), methods not relatively distinctive and in no sense autono-
mous. This, however, would be because the judges had given up on 
law-like methods and not because of anything inherent in applicational 
legal reasoning. 
Finally, law has, or seems to have, a kind of specialized value the-
ory of its own. At the least, some categories of values are more or less 
inherently implicated in law, in tolerably well-ordered societies any-
how. To the extent that these values are in some sense legal, we have 
here another dimension of law's relative autonomy, although law re-
mains, of course, heavily dependent on still other categories of values, 
too. 
Legal institutions such as adjudication depend for their moral 
force and for the acceptability of their outcomes on the realization of 
special participatory values. Accordingly, adjudication pointedly pro-
vides for various participating roles. 66 Also, as noted above, 67 a wide 
range of values - rationales - lies behind the basic varieties of for-
mality in the law, rationales that leave their imprint on the material 
content of statutes, precedents, and other species of law. Many of 
these rationales are so intimately legal that they are often character-
ized as "rule of law" values. Similarly, I have identified a category of 
values that figures in the justificatory force of certain standard argu-
64. The topic has even engaged our very best theorists. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Reflections on 
Holding and Dictum, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 431 (1989). 
65. I have elsewhere argued in quite specific terms that law, legal analysis, and legal theory 
are not reducible to economics. See Summers, Economics and the Autonomy of Law, Legal Anal-
ysis, and Legal Theory, in VERNUNFf UNO ERFAHRUNG JM RECHTSDENKEN DER GEGENWART 
395-408 (T. Eckhoff, L. Friedman & J. Uusitalo eds. 1986); Summers, The Future of Economics 
in Legal Education: Limits and Constraints, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 337, 344-48 (1983). 
66. See generally L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 705-08, 712-14, 727-29 
(temp. ed. 1949) (moral force of adjudication is at its maximum where certain conditions, such as 
participation by disputants, are met); Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes - A 
Plea for Process Values, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974) (participatory governance and procedural 
rationality are important to determining the quality of a legal process). 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 17-30. 
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ments in statutory interpretation 68 and in reasoning from precedent. 69 
Then, too, legal values include a whole class of substantive reasons -
elsewhere I have called these "rightness" reasons - which are non-
consequentialist and yet dominate much of the common law.70 Impor-
tant past-regarding values are implicated in these reasons, including 
justified reliance, good faith, fair notice, just desert, and more. We do 
not yet fully understand how and why rightness reasons and their con-
comitant values are so prominent in the common law, but I will not be 
surprised if the values that figure in these reasons are ultimately found 
to be somehow distinctively congenial to the concerns of the common 
law and its methodology. Certain implementational vall,les - values 
having to do with the efficacy of factfinding, with the measurability of 
harms, and the like - relate to the ultimate limits of law itself. To my 
knowledge, no one has drawn all of the various categories of values I 
have listed here together (and there may be more) and subjected them 
to systematic analysis. 71 To the extent that the very nature of law and 
of social ordering through law presupposes, draws upon, or implicates 
such values in ways that give them special definition, content, and 
meaning, these values are uniquely legal or intimately related to law 
- and, perhaps, they comprise a significant domain of law's relative 
autonomy. 
VII. LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE ACADEMY 
Of course, Judge Posner is also ex-Professor Posner of the Univer-
sity of Chicago. In various places he expresses opinions on legal edu-
cation and on his days as a student at the Harvard Law School. He 
concedes that the case method and the Socratic method remain "inval-
uable" methods that provide "essential preparation for the practice of 
law" (p. 3). Yet he also expresses grave doubt whether the Socratic 
method really "teaches reasoning at all, beyond honing the students' 
skills in identifying contradictions" (p. 98). Moreover, he suggests 
that the system of "legal education" turns out lawyers who are unin-
terested in "legislative" facts - in the causes and consequences of so-
cial ills and in the social effects of legal doctrines generally (p. 468). 
Indeed, he closes this work with a plea for much more science, espe-
cially social science, in law. 
I have no quarrel with Judge Posner's plea for more science, 
although I have less faith than he that science can so readily provide 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 31-52. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57. 
70. See generally Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Com-
mon Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 752-74 (1978). 
71. For a valuable treatment of several aspects of this subject, see P. STEIN & J. SHAND, 
LEGAL VALUES IN WESTERN SOCIETY 1-113 (1974). 
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answers for law. 72 I also doubt that Judge Posner could marshal 
much evidence to support his conclusion that lawyers generally are 
uninterested in "legislative facts," and I think even less evidence sup-
ports his suggestion that the Socratic method explains any aversion 
lawyers may have to legislative factfinding. Certainly Judge Posner 
leaves these matters unsupported. 
But what I most wish to do is respond briefly to Judge Posner's 
remarks on Socratic teaching and the case method. Although time-
honored, Socratic teaching is now in decline in the American law 
school, and it badly needs defenders. In my view its virtues are legion, 
and go well beyond what Judge Posner at one point credits it with -
sharpening student sensitivity to "contradictions." I believe it fitting, 
in this jurisprudential essay, to address the aspects of Socratic teaching 
and the case method that relate to the very nature of law itself. Of 
course, I can do so here only in suggestive terms. 
The Socratic method is more faithful to the very nature of law than 
other methods. Law is not like a temperature gauge from which one 
merely reads off information. Law is inherently dialectical, in its crea-
tion and especially in its application. Much didactic teaching tends to 
falsify this reality. Socratic teaching, which is dialectical, does not. 
Socratic teaching is distinctively appropriate to American law. 
Our law is vast and fast-moving. Even assuming that it would other-
wise be desirable to teach, in didactic fashion, all the basic law of our 
system, this could not be done in three years, and much of what was 
"learned" in this fashion would be obsolete before long anyway. So-
cratic teaching necessarily requires limited focus on particular areas of 
law, but the skills, attitudes of mind, and other qualities so imparted 
are transferable to other areas. 
Law is inherently applicative, and it purports to apply to reality 
largely through the medium of language. Yet to a considerable extent 
law's very meaning resides in how it applies to concrete fact. Dialecti-
cal teaching through the medium of case materials, with all their con-
crete factual richness, can provide a more authentic experience of the 
reality of law for the participants than can didactic teaching. (This 
may be different in "code" systems where law has a more abstract and 
less applicative quality.) 
The best Socratic teaching dwells more intimately than can didac-
tic teaching upon the required qualities of reasons, and of rules, if 
these qualities are to figure appropriately in legal analysis and justifica-
tion. In this regard, law just is a kind of process of thought (having 
positive as well as normative relevance). Consider, for example, 
72. Cohen and Fuller also were skeptical about this. See Cohen, The Social Sciences and the 
Natural Sciences, in THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS 437 (y/. Ogburn & A. 
Goldenweiser eds. 1927), and see my summary of Fuller's views in Summers, supra note 2, at 
442-44. 
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thought about substantive reasons in the justification of judicial deci-
sions. Some substantive reasons are much more appropriate than 
others. Indeed, no fewer than ten major criteria may be relevant to 
evaluating the appropriateness of a given type of substantive reason for 
use in the law, criteria that must be explored to some extent in any 
Socratic instruction worthy of the name.73 Consider, as a second ex-
ample, the process of thought that goes into the extraction and formu-
lation of legal rules, the hypothetical testing of proposed formulations 
of rules including the resort to limiting cases, the rational drawing of 
lines in determining the contours of rules, and the determination of 
whether facts relevant to the assessment of proposed formulations of 
rules are available and what bearing their availability should have. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Judge Posner suggests that jurisprudence should not be the exclu-
sive province of specialists (p. xiii). He means by this rather more 
than that lawyers, law students, and others should take some interest 
in the subject. He believes nonspecialists can also contribute solutions 
to the problems of jurisprudence. But in such matters the proof is in 
the pudding. Judge Posner has made a major and lasting contribution 
in mediating between the disciplines of economics and law. In my 
opinion, his attempt at jurisprudence is not quite so successful. This 
should hardly be surprising, especially to followers of Adam Smith, 
given that Judge Posner could not have put as much by way of re-
sources into jurisprudence as he has put, over many years, and with so 
much profit, into the economic analysis of law. 
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(2) conventional justificatory force, (3) commensurability with other reasons, ( 4) intelligibility 
and persuasiveness, (5) transmutability into stable rule, (6) "guidesomeness," (7) efficient con-
structability, (8) possible arbitrariness of "boundary conditions," (9) general "range" of the rea-
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